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FEDERAL PREEMPTION—THE HAZY LINE OF COMMON
LAW CLAIM PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT
JESSICA MANNON*
IN TOBIN V. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.,1 the First Circuit heldthat Tobin’s tort claims against Federal Express Corporation
(FedEx) for the mislabeling and misdelivery of a package that
contained marijuana were preempted by the Airline Deregula-
tion Act (ADA).2 In so doing, the court reluctantly extended the
ADA’s preemption of common law claims to a point so periph-
eral to the Act’s purpose that similarly-situated plaintiffs may
lack a remedy. The First Circuit’s decision blurs the already hazy
line of preemption so that it might gradually envelop every com-
mon law cause of action as “related to a price, route, or service
of an air carrier.”3 While still applying the statute “in the way
that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it,” the court
should have recognized the claims as “tenuous, remote, or pe-
ripheral,” so as to fall outside the ADA’s protective carapace and
preserve Tobin’s remedy.4
Tobin brought an action against FedEx for invasion of pri-
vacy, infliction of emotional distress, and negligence after she
and her two young daughters received a mislabeled and misde-
livered package that contained marijuana.5 The sender of the
package in question requested priority overnight delivery and
affixed a handwritten label.6 A FedEx employee inputted the
* Jessica Mannon is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May, 2017, at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. She received a B.B.S. in Political
Science from Hardin-Simmons University in 2010, summa cum laude. Jessica is
grateful to her husband, Jason Mannon, for his enduring support, and to her
family for their constant encouragement.
1 775 F.3d 448, 449 (1st Cir. 2014).
2 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012).
3 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 452.
4 Id. at 454, 457.
5 Id. at 449.
6 Id.
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handwritten information to generate a printed label, which
showed the wrong address—Tobin’s home address—and a cou-
rier brought it to the address printed (the location of Tobin’s
home where her young children also resided).7 Thinking it was
a birthday present for her eleven-year-old daughter, the two
opened the package together, only to discover the marijuana
inside.8 The police responded quickly, and an officer told Tobin
that he was concerned for her family’s safety because the in-
tended recipient might come looking for the package.9 FedEx
noted the officer’s request to flag the shipment and refrain from
disclosing any information about the actual delivery address.10
The same day, a woman called FedEx twice attempting to get
information about the package. She supplied the tracking num-
ber to FedEx and maintained that the package was misdeliv-
ered.11 On the first call, a FedEx employee initiated a “trace”
after the woman requested the delivery location, but on the sec-
ond call, the woman voiced her (accurate) belief about where
the package was delivered and said she would get the package
herself.12 A little over an hour after the officer left her home,
Tobin “heard a male voice coming through her unlocked screen
door asking if she had received a package that day.”13 Startled,
she rushed to bolt the door shut, told the man she did not have
his package, and noticed two other men sitting in a car parked
in her driveway.14
Tobin alleged that FedEx was responsible not only for misla-
beling and misdelivering the package, but also for wrongfully
disclosing her address.15 She sued for damages in Massachusetts
state court under a statute and several common law theories.16
FedEx removed the case to federal district court.17 The district
court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment on the
7 Id.
8 Mass. Mom Sues FedEx for Giving Suspected Drug Dealers Her Address, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 1, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mass-mom-sues-fedex-
for-giving-suspected-drug-dealers-her-address/ [https://perma.cc/8EFK-N9G9].




13 Kevin Koeninger, World-Class Screw-up at FedEx, Mom Says, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERV. (Feb. 28, 2013, 7:08 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/02/28/
55278.htm [https://perma.cc/PV4S-8FPT].
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statutory claim and several of her common law claims.18 In re-
viewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
the appellate court reduced Tobin’s claims to three factual
premises: “(1) that FedEx mislabeled the package; (2) that
FedEx misdelivered the package; and (3) that FedEx disclosed
her address to third parties.”19 While FedEx did not dispute the
first two assertions, it “vigorously” denied disclosing the
address.20
The issues before the court were (1) whether FedEx disclosed
the address; and (2) if the ADA preempts Tobin’s remaining
claims.21 To overcome summary judgment on the address disclo-
sure issue, Tobin had to prove that an actual disclosure took
place.22 However, the court summarily dismissed her argument
in three paragraphs as a “laundry list” of possibilities and hy-
potheticals.23 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry
of summary judgment on Tobin’s statutory invasion of privacy
claims and her three common law claims “to the extent” the
claims hinged on the disclosure of information by FedEx.24 The
court then analyzed Tobin’s three tort claims “to the extent that
those claims hinge on FedEx’s admitted mislabeling and misde-
livery of the package.”25 The court held that the ADA pre-
empted the claims, because they (1) “inexorably” implicated
FedEx’s services; (2) were sufficiently “related” to those services
to trigger preemption; and (3) might produce a “forbidden ef-
fect” by freezing services in place that the future market may not
dictate.26
The court began its analysis with the Supremacy Clause be-
cause state law that contravenes federal law is null and void.27
This is an express preemption case because the ADA contains a
preemption clause and FedEx is a regulated air carrier.28 Con-
gress desired market forces to maximally determine airline fares
and services, so it enacted the ADA to ensure that the states
18 Id.





24 Id. at 452.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 453–57.
27 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210–11 (1824); Brown v. United Airlines, Inc.,
720 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2013).
28 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 452.
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would not replace federal deregulation with state regulation.29
The court’s ADA inquiry was condensed to a two-part question:
(1) a “mechanism” question that asked if plaintiff’s claims were
“predicated on a . . . provision having the force and effect of
law” (answered affirmatively by the Supreme Court in Northwest
v. Ginsberg); and (2) a “linkage” question—whether the plain-
tiff’s common law claims were sufficiently related to a “service”
of FedEx.30 Because the Supreme Court recently clarified that
common law claims can fall within preemption’s scope, the First
Circuit only considered whether Tobin’s claims were sufficiently
“related to” a service of FedEx.31
The court relied on the definition of a “service” under the
ADA from Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., where a service represents
“bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor from one party
to another,” and matters appurtenant to the contract of car-
riage.32 Noting the “wide sweep” the Supreme Court has given
the term service in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens and Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n by labeling any state law that enlarges
the duties of carriers as an appurtenance to airline “services,”
the court said that package handling, address verification, and
package delivery implicate FedEx’s services.33 Tobin argued that
she could not bargain for the delivery of an unwanted package
and that as a stranger to the transaction, misdelivery could not
be a preempted service; however, the court cited two examples
where ADA preemption does not require the plaintiff to be a
customer.34 Next, the court quoted Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., determining that state laws having a “connection” with
an airline’s services are preempted, but acknowledged that the
connection cannot be de minimis.35 If the connection to prices,
29 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 367–68 (2008) (citing
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992)).
30 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 453 (citing Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422,
1430 (2014)).
31 Id.
32 Id. (citing Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995)
(en banc)).
33 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 453; see Rowe, 522 U.S. at 368–69; Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); see also Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S.
Ct. 1769 (2013) (Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s preemp-
tion provision is in pertinent part identical to the preemption provision of ADA).
34 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 454 (citing Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85,
88–89, 95 (1st Cir. 2013) (claims by a non-customer parent); DiFiore v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 83, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2011) (claims by baggage handlers)).
35 Id. (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383–84
(1992)).
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routes, and services is “tenuous, remote, or peripheral,” ADA
preemption will not attach.36 If the plaintiff proved her case, the
court opined, it would impose a “fundamentally new set of obli-
gations on the airlines” or at least supplant market forces with
common law definitions of reasonableness and create a patch-
work of regulations.37 Although the plaintiff analogized her
“garden variety” tort claims to personal injury claims, which
sometimes escape preemption, the court side-stepped the point
by saying that the Morales framework calls for an individual as-
sessment of the facts rather than categorization by claim type.38
“Although claims arising out of careless driving or infelicitously
placed packages may not impose any greater duty on an airline
. . . the common-law claims here are of a different genre.”39
The court’s “dividing line” was the character and scope of the
duty of care imposed; where an alleged breach of the duty of
care could “effect fundamental changes in the carrier’s current
or future service offerings,” ADA preemption attaches.40 Al-
though Tobin pointed out that her claims would not impose du-
ties different than those the market already demands (to label
and deliver packages in an accurate manner), the court said the
purpose of the ADA is that “protean demands of the market”
dictate airline services, and market demands “could change at
any time.”41 If Tobin’s claims escaped preemption, the court
cautions, accuracy in labeling in shipping as a carrier service
may be frozen in place, regardless of what the market may dic-
tate in the future.42
If Tobin had been able to prove that FedEx disclosed her ad-
dress, the court could have instead categorized the claim as “ten-
uous, remote, and peripheral,” so as to avoid preemption.43 The
court emphasized that this was a “hard case” with an “atypical
fact pattern;” and the facts are parallel to claims the Supreme
36 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
100 n.21 (1983)).
37 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 455 (discussing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373; Bower, 731 F.3d at
96).
38 Id. at 455–56; see generally Owens v. Anthony, No. 2-11-033, 2011 WL
6056409, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished) (tort claims arising
from delivery truck driver’s negligence in causing wreck not preempted); Kuene
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 N.E.2d 870, 872, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
39 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 456.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 453–56.
43 See id. at 454.
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Court recently held were not preempted.44 For example, the ad-
dress disclosure would have taken place after FedEx’s “service”
to the package sender ended, a dispositive point in Dan’s City
Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, where claims survived preemption be-
cause they could not be “related to” services that ended before
the conduct on which the claims were based occurred.45 The
Court also noted that the Dan’s City Used Cars claims were un-
likely to “freeze into place services that carriers might prefer to
discontinue in the future.”46 Similarly, the services that would
potentially freeze in place if Tobin’s claims succeeded—accu-
rate labeling, delivery, and protection of consumer privacy—are
so central to FedEx’s business that, were the “protean market” to
dictate something else, FedEx may go out of business.47 Moreo-
ver, the standard of care that may be imputed to FedEx is the
ubiquitous ordinary care “against which all individuals order
their affairs.”48 But this alternate analysis avoiding preemption
would have been unlikely in light of recent First Circuit
precedent.49
The court’s decision to preempt the claims based only on the
mislabeling and misdelivery technically adheres to the applica-
tion of ADA preemption as the Supreme Court has interpreted
it. Nevertheless, this holding, as well as the First Circuit’s likely
preemption of Tobin’s claims even if she had proven disclosure,
creates a result beyond the scope of what Congress intended
under the ADA and may leave similarly-situated plaintiffs with-
out a remedy.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a presumption
against preemption of state laws that fall within the traditional
police power of the states, unless it is the clear intent of Con-
gress.50 Preemption analysis “must be guided by respect for the
separate spheres of governmental authority . . . . To determine
whether Congress had such an intent, [Stevens] believe[d] that
a consideration of the history and structure of the ADA is more
44 See id. at 457, 449.
45 See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2013).
46 Id.
47 See id.; Tobin, 775 F.3d at 448, 456.
48 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1995) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
49 See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2013); Bower v.
EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2013).
50 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
2016] CASE NOTE 129
illuminating than a narrow focus on the words ‘relating to.’”51
Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938 and gave the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) the power to prohibit unfair
competition in air transportation.52 The CAB’s power was not
exclusive, as a savings clause preserved existing common law
remedies.53 Congress withdrew from the economic regulation of
airlines and passed the ADA to encourage market control and to
keep states from substituting the federal deregulation, but it re-
tained the savings clause and the CAB’s authority to regulate
unfair trade practices.54 Since it retained the unfair trade prac-
tices authority when it deregulated air carriers (despite its
penchant for market-driven control), there is no indication that
Congress intended to foreclose common law remedies either.55
“Surely Congress could not have intended to pre-empt every
state and local law and regulation that similarly increases the
airlines’ costs of doing business and, consequently[,] has a simi-
lar ‘significant impact’ upon their rates.”56 Hodges, the case from
which Tobin adopted its definition of “service,” presents similar
reasoning: the CAB’s statements strongly support the view that
the ADA was concerned solely with economic regulation and
not displacing state tort law.57 The Hodges court also noted that
carriers are still required to maintain insurance to cover per-
sonal injury liability.58 Complete preemption in this area, which
the First Circuit’s reasoning in Tobin would virtually create,
would render insurance coverage useless.59 Finally, the Supreme
Court provides the example that zoning laws are not preempted
because they are peculiarly within the province of state author-
ity.60 So, too, are tort remedies.61 A broad application of “related
to” that envelops even claims several steps removed from airline
services, such as a claim because a vehicle has been wrongfully
sold by a carrier, or a claim by a stranger to any airline services
whose privacy was invaded by carrier negligence (such as
51 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 420–21 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 422–23.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 423–24.
56 Id. at 427.
57 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995).
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1780–81 (2013).
61 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
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Tobin), “leaves no law to govern resolution of a non-contract-
based dispute.”62 Federal law does not speak to these issues and
“[n]o such design can be attributed to a rational Congress.”63
“It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without com-
ment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those impaired
by illegal conduct,”64 but this is what the First Circuit foreshad-
ows with a harsh application of preemption of claims “related
to” carrier services. Most courts agree that the ADA does not
provide for a private right of action.65 The Supreme Court al-
lowed breach of contract claims to succeed under Wolens, but
the ADA still preempts any state-imposed obligations or legal
theories beyond the airline’s self-imposed contractual undertak-
ings.66 Likewise, there is some authority indicating that the ADA
may not preempt safety-related personal injury claims arising
from airline operations.67 But for non-contracting parties who
are simply visited upon by tortious conduct unrelated to airline
operations, there is no remedy if claims are preempted. To echo
Dan’s City Used Cars, “if such state laws are preempted, no law
would govern resolution of a non-contract-based dispute arising
from a towing company’s disposal of a vehicle previously towed
or afford a remedy for wrongful disposal . . . . No such design
can be attributed to a rational Congress.”68
In this case, an innocent bystander suffered great angst be-
cause of conduct she did not contract for or invite, and her
daughters were traumatized by the experience. Fortunately, the
result was not tragic, as Tobin and her daughters did not suffer
actual bodily harm. But even had they been physically injured,
the court’s analysis was pretty clear that it would preempt her
claims regardless of actual harm suffered. Northwest v. Ginsberg
confirmed that the ADA may preempt common law claims that
are “related to” a route, price or service, the question of what
that includes is still unclear.69 While technically in line with Su-
preme Court precedent, the First Circuit’s broad application of
preemption makes it unclear what claims may be “tenuous, re-
62 See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
63 Id. at 1781.
64 Id.
65 Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47–48 (D. Mass. 2011).
66 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–29 (1995).
67 See id. at 231 n.7.
68 Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1781.
69 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430–31 (2014).
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mote, or peripheral,” if Tobin’s were not.70 Additionally, while
economic deregulation is an important touchstone for preemp-
tion analysis, it should not eclipse congressional intent. Particu-
larly if Tobin had proved that FedEx disclosed her address, the
court should not have preempted her claims. In light of the
changing landscape in shipping and delivery, our infatuation
with promises of drone delivery,71 and our increasing reliance
on internet shopping, it is plausible to envision future similarly-
situated plaintiffs who have no contract with a carrier yet suffer
injury because of the carrier’s actions. We should be able to as-
sure non-contracting parties who are randomly injured by a car-
rier’s tortious conduct that they will be able to pursue a remedy
but, unfortunately, the line of preemption is still hazy.
70 See Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 454–55 (1st Cir. 2014).
71 60 Minutes Overtime, Amazon Unveils Futuristic Plan: Delivery by Drone, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-unveils-futuristic-
plan-delivery-by-drone/ [https://perma.cc/RTW4-QG67].
